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Abstract
We provide a quantum key distribution protocol based on the correlations of the
Greenburger-Horne-Zeilinger(GHZ) state. No classical communication is needed in the
process of the establishment of the key. Our protocol is useful when an unjammable clas-
sical communication channel is unavailable. We prove that the protocol is secure.
1 Introduction
Cryptography is the art of transmitting secret information over insecure channels. If the two
parties share a random sequence of bits (a key), they can encrypt the plain text with the key.
So how to distribute a secret key is crucial for secure communication. In classical cryptography
it is the most difficult problem.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol is a good way to solve this problem in which
the key is kept secret by the fundamental principle of quantum mechanics. So it’s secure. The
first quantum key distribution protocol is proposed by by C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard in
1984 (so called BB84 protocol) [1]. Since then several quantum key distribution protocols have
been established and their securities have been studied [2-6]. Many experiments have been
done [7-11]. In those protocols above there are two channels needed: a quantum channel to
transmit quantum qubits and a classical channel to exchange classical information. Moreover
the classical channel must be unjammable though it could be insecure. But it seems that this
condition is not always practicable. If there is no unjammable classical channel available, none
of them can succeed.
In this paper we propose a new QKD scheme in which classical communication isn’t needed.
It’s based on the correlations of GHZ state. Side A creates n three qubits system in GHZ state
and sends the third qubit of them to side B. Side B encodes his key in the qubits and sends
them back. When side A receives the qubits, he can extract the key by performing operation
and measurement on the three qubits system. The delicate nature of entanglement guarantees
that no other people can get the key.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly introduce the basic idea on which
our QKD protocol is based. Then the protocol is provided in section 3. Next in section 4 we
prove that it is secure. At last we give a brief discussion on it.
2 Basic Idea
First we introduce the concept of the Bell state measurement briefly. It is a measurement on a
two-qubit system in which the basis for measurement is the maximally entangled states
|Φ+ >= 1√
2
(|00 > +|11 >)
|Φ− >= 1√
2
(|00 > −|11 >)
|Ψ+ >= 1√
2
(|01 > +|10 >)
|Ψ− >= 1√
2
(|01 > −|10 >).
(1)
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The four states are also called Bell states.
The GHZ state is proposed by Greenburger, Horne and Zeilinger [12]. It’s an entangled
state of a three qubits system. It is expressed as
|∆ >= 1√
2
(|000 > +|111 >). (2)
For simplicity we call the three-qubit system the tripartite system. If we perform a CONTROLLED-
NOT (CNOT) operation on the first qubit (as the target qubit) and the second qubit (as the
control qubit). The state of the tripartite system is transformed into
1√
2
(|000 > +|011 >) = |0 > ⊗ 1√
2
(|00 > +|11 >). (3)
So the first qubit is no longer entangled with the other two. The tripartite system has been
divided into two independent subsystems. Consider the subsystem of the last two qubits, we
will notice that it is just in a Bell state |Φ+ >.
On the other hand, If we perform a unitary operation σx on the third qubit of the GHZ
state where
σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
. (4)
Then we get
|∆′ >= 1√
2
(|001 > +|110 >) (5)
Performing the CNOT operation as above, we obtain
1√
2
(|001 > +|010 >) = |0 > ⊗ 1√
2
(|01 > +|10 >). (6)
So the subsystem of the last two qubits is also in a Bell state |Ψ+ >. Obviously if we can do
the Bell state measurement on the last two qubits, we can distinguish the state equation(3)
and the state equation(6), that is to say, we can distinguish |∆ > and |∆′ > by the procedure
above. So we can apply this fact to establish a key shared by two sides.
3 Quantum distribution protocol without classical com-
munications
We assume that the two sides who want to communicate are Alice and Bob. Eve, another one,
wants to eavesdrop. If Alice wants to communicate with Bob, they do as follows.
(1):Alice creates n tripartite systems in state |∆ > and sends the third qubit of each tripartite
system to Bob.
(2):When Bob receives the qubits, he performs σx operation or does nothing at random on each
qubit. When he performs σx, he writes down ’1’ while when he does nothing, he writes down
’0’. Finally he has a n-bit string k.
(3):Bob sends the qubits back to Alice.
(4):After receiving every qubit, Alice combines it with the corresponding two qubits in her hand.
Then to every tripartite system Alice performs CNOT operation on the first and the second
qubit in which the first one is the target qubit and the second one is the control qubit. Then
she does a Bell state measurement on the last two qubits. When the measurement outcome is
|Φ+ >, she writes down ’0’ and when it is |Ψ+ >, she writes down ’1’. But if the measurement
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outcome is |Φ− > or |Ψ− >, the protocol fails. So Alice abandons it and turns to (1).
(5):At last Alice also gets a n-bit string k
′
and she can assure k
′
= k. It is the key shared by
both the two sides.
So far Alice and Bob have shared a key. The process of quantum key distribution is com-
pleted. We can notice that no classical communication is needed in the establishment of the
key.
Finally there is a problem left. How does Bob know wether the key has been established or
not? Because there is no classical channel available, Alice can’t inform Bob by sending classical
message as in the previous protocols. We can stipulate that if Alice finds that the protocol fails
in step (4), she should turn to step (1) and resend. When Bob receives qubits again, he knows
that the previous work has failed. So Bob begins to establish a new key. We definite a maximal
waiting time tc. If Bob hasn’t received the qubits resent from Alice after tc, he knows that the
key has been established successfully. On the other hand we stipulate the terminal condition.
If Alice has sent qubits to Bob for 10 times, she still can’t get the correct key. So she gives
up and sends n random qubits to Bob as the terminal signal. When Bob receives the qubits
from Alice for the 11st time, he knows that the effort to establish a key from Alice has been
terminated. So he also gives up.
4 Security of the quantum key distribution protocol
This protocol is secure because of the fundamental principle in quantum mechanics. If Eve
intercepts and captures the qubits which Bob sends to Alice, she can’t prevent her existence
from being found. We give the proof of it below.
Now let’s consider the possible attacks to the protocol. The aim of eavesdropper, Eve, is to
obtain the key.
First we can note that Eve can intercept and capture the qubits when Alice sends them to
Bob and when Bob sends them back to Alice. But it’s unhelpful for Eve to catch the qubits sent
from Alice to Bob. Since in fact the key is created by Bob, there is no information about the key
contained in the qubits which Alice sends to Bob because the key hasn’t been created. Actually
from our protocol all people including Eve know that each of these qubits is the third qubit of
a GHZ state |∆ >. But this fact is valueless for any eavedropper. So Eve will concentrate on
the qubits sent back from Bob to Alice.
When Bob sends the qubits back to Alice, Eve can catch the qubits. But measuring the
qubits is unhelpful, because the density matrix of the qubits is
ρ = Tr|∆ >
= Tr12{ 1√
2
(|000 > +|111 >) 1√
2
(< 000|+ < 111|)}
= 1
2
(|0 > +|1 >)(< 0|+ < 1|)
(7)
or
ρ = Tr|∆′ >
= Tr12{ 1√
2
(|001 > +|110 >) 1√
2
(< 001|+ < 110|)}
= 1
2
(|0 > +|1 >)(< 0|+ < 1|)
(8)
where Tr12 denotes the partial trace over qubit 1 and qubit 2. If she measures the qubits, she
will get outcome ’0’ and ’1’ with equal probability 1
2
. So she can’t find wether the state of the
tripartite system is |∆ > or |∆′ >, in other words, she can’t get any information about the key.
Moreover Alice will find Eve’s existence easily when she gets the qubits sent back.
Consider the qubit on which Bob does nothing, the state of the tripartite system is |∆ >. If
Eve’s measurement outcome is ’0’, the state of the tripartite system will be |000 >. According
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to the protocol Alice performs CNOT operation,
CNOT : |000 >−→ |000 > . (9)
It can be noted that
|000 >= |0 > ⊗ 1√
2
(|Φ+ > +|Φ− >). (10)
When Alice does the Bell state measurement on the last two qubits, the outcomes is |Φ+ >
and |Φ− > with equal probability 1
2
. If Alice’s measurement outcome is ’1’, the state of the
tripartite system will be |111 >. Then Alice performs CNOT operation.
CNOT : |111 >−→ |011 > . (11)
We can see
|011 >= |0 > ⊗ 1√
2
(|Φ+ > −|Φ− >). (12)
Similarly Alice will get |Φ+ > and |Φ− > with equal probability 1
2
by doing a Bell state
measurement. But in the protocol we know that if no eavesdroppers exist, it’s impossible for
Alice to obtain measurement outcomes |Φ− >. Once Alice gets |Φ− >, she knows that someone
has eavesdropped.
Then consider the qubit on which Bob does σx operation, the state of the tripartite system is
|∆′ >. Eve catches and measures the qubit sent back from Bob to Alice. When her measurement
outcome is ’1’, the state of the tripartite system is transformed into |001 >. After receiving the
qubit, Alice performs a CNOT operation
CNOT : |001 >−→ |001 > . (13)
Doing the same reasoning as above,
|001 >= |0 > ⊗ 1√
2
(|Ψ+ > +|Ψ− >). (14)
Performing the Bell state measurement, Alice will get |Ψ+ > and |Ψ− > with equal probability
1
2
. When Eve’s measurement is ’0’, the state of the tripartite system is |110 >. Then Alice
performs the CNOT operation
CNOT : |110 >−→ |010 > . (15)
Similarly we know
|010 >= |0 > ⊗ 1√
2
(|Ψ+ > −|Ψ− >). (16)
Obviously Alice gets |Ψ+ > and |Ψ− > with equal probability 1
2
by doing the Bell state
measurement. So if Alice gets |Ψ− >, she can assert the existence of Eve.
Then we calculate the probability that Eve escapes from being found. We assume that Bob
does σx operation and does nothing with equal probability
1
2
. The probability that Alice gets
correct measurement for one qubit though Eve has attacked is
1
2
× 1
2
+
1
2
× 1
2
=
1
2
. (17)
If n=1000, the probability that Alice couldn’t find Eve’s existence after the establishment of
the key has been completed is
Perror = (
1
2
)1000 ≈ (10)−300 (18)
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It’s a digit too small to imagine. In fact we can say that it is impossible for Eve to cheat without
being found. So we can conclude that if Eve catches the qubits and measures them, she can’t
prevent herself from being found, in other words, the attack fails.
Now, we discuss another strategy of attack. Suppose that Eve captures the qubit from Bob
to Alice, she perform a CNOT operation. The control qubit is the qubit captured and the
target qubit is an auxiliary qubit |0 >E owned by Eve. After the CNOT operation, the state
of the four qubits system is
CNOT : |∆ > |0 >E−→ 1√
2
( |000 > |0 >E
+ |111 > |1 >E) (19)
or
CNOT : |∆′ > |0 >E−→ 1√
2
( |001 > |1 >E
+ |110 > |0 >E).
(20)
Alice performs the CNOT operation on the first and the second qubit according the protocol,
the state is transformed into
|S >Four= 1√
2
|000 > |0 >E +|011 > |1 >E (21)
or
|S′ >Four= 1√
2
|001 > |1 >E +|010 > |0 >E . (22)
Equation(21) can be rewritten as
|S >Four = 12 |0 > (|Φ+ > +|Φ− >)|0 >E
+ 1
2
|0 > (|Φ+ > −|Φ− >)|1 >E . (23)
So when Alice does the Bell state measurement on the second and the third qubit, she will
obtain |Φ+ > and |Φ− > with equal probability 1
2
. Equation(22) can be rewritten as
|S′ >Four = 12 |0 > (|Ψ+ > +|Ψ− >)|1 >E
+ 1
2
|0 > (|Ψ+ > −|Ψ− >)|0 >E . (24)
So Alice will get |Ψ+ > and |Ψ− > with equal probability 1
2
by doing the Bell state measurement.
Similarly we can calculate the probability that Eve prevents her from being found. The
probability for one qubit is
1
2
× 1
2
+
1
2
× 1
2
=
1
2
. (25)
If n=1000, the probability that Eve’s cheating isn’t found will be
Perror = (
1
2
)1000 ≈ (10)−300. (26)
So this strategy of attack also fails.
Now we have proved that our protocol is secure.
5 Discussion and conclusion
We provide a quantum key distribution protocol without classical communication. In contrast to
previous protocols it doesn’t need an auxiliary classical channel to complete the key distribution.
So it may be useful while a reliable classical channel is unavailable. One disadvantage of this
protocol is that it needs to do operations on the qubits, such as σx and CNOT. This adds
difficulties to carrying it out technically. But we can expect the difficulties will be overcome by
the development of technology. Finally the protocol is proved to be secure.
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